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Abstract
This paper studies majority voting over the size and location of a public good when voters
di¤er both in income and in their preferences for the public good location. Public good
provision is nanced either by a lump sum tax or by a proportional income tax. We ana-
lyze both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the public goods size and
location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional
median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate need not coincide with the
preferences of a median income citizen.
With lump sum nancing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equi-
librium consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred
by the individual located at the median distance from the median. This policy bundle also
constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case of a uniform bivari-
ate distribution of individuals income and location. With proportional taxation, there is
no policy equilibrium with simultaneous voting. We o¤er a complete characterization of the
equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the general case and we show why and
how our results depart from those most-preferred by the median income individual located
at the median distance from the median. We also compare these majority voting allocations
with the socially optimal one.
Keywords: proportional income taxation, bidimensional policy and trait spaces.
JEL Codes: D72, H41
1 Introduction
Our main objective in this paper is to contribute to the analysis of majority voting over
public good provision when both the policy space and the space of voterstraits are multidi-
mensional. Models of democratic public good provision are of interest by themselves, since
they shed light on the determinants of the size and type of public goods o¤ered in democ-
racies. Such models are also at the center of the emerging literature on nation formation,
whose main objective is to understand the determinants of the number, size and stability of
nations. Although our paper does not attempt to introduce such considerations, surveying
this literature allows us to take stock of how public good provision under majority voting
has been analyzed and to improve upon the models developed.
Contributions to this literature di¤er according to several dimensions. First, they ei-
ther deal with the case where the policy choice is horizontal (with citizens selecting the
location of their capital or the proportion of a xed budget to be allocated to a specic
public good), vertical (with citizens typically choosing the quantity of a public good), or
where both the horizontal and vertical components are voted upon. Second, the citizens
may be heterogeneous in their preferences for the public good, in their income, or in both.
Papers di¤er also in whether the distribution of the source of heterogeneity (income and/or
preferences) is restricted to be uniform, or whether more general distribution functions are
considered. Finally, they di¤er in how the public good is to be nanced: by a lump sum tax
or by a proportional income tax. Table 1 summarizes how articles di¤er according to these
dimensions.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Our paper generalizes the existing literature by incorporating simultaneously the follow-
ing characteristics: we study the determination by majority voting of both the (horizontal)
type and (vertical) size of a public good, when voters di¤er both in income and in their
preferences for the type (i.e., location) of good provided. The distribution of voterstraits is
given by a generic bivariate distribution function (i.e., we go beyond the uniform distribution
case). We also study both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the type
and size of the public good.
We now explain why the generalizations we propose are relevant and how the results
we obtain qualify and extend those obtained in the literature. Decisions regarding the type
and size of the public good to be provided are obviously closely linked and would be better
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understood with a simultaneous voting model. Unfortunately, moving to more than one
dimension leads to a discontinuous leap in complexity, as it is well known that simultaneous
majority voting on multidimensional policy spaces generically has no equilibrium.1 Our
rst objective is to clarify under which circumstances (i.e., characteristics of the bivariate
distribution of individual traits) a majority voting (or Condorcet) equilibrium exists when
voting simultaneously over the type and size of the public good. The answer to this question
depends on the type of public good nancing considered: lump sum or with a proportional
income tax. In the rst case, we obtain that a majority voting equilibrium exists only if
the distribution of preferences in the economy is median uniform. This condition, which we
precisely dene, is very stringent (although satised by the uniform distribution) and non
generic. In the case of proportional income taxation, a majority voting equilibrium never
exists.
These results explain why the few papers (Alesina et al. (1999), Etro (2006), Gregorini
(2009), Perroni and Scharf (2001))2 studying both public good dimensions assume that
majority voting is sequential. At rst glance, a sequential mechanism looks safe from the
point of view of existence as soon as preferences are regular enough (in particular, single-
peaked on each dimension) since each vote is unidimensional. Note however that, unless its
is assumed that the two components are totally separable, the backward resolution will lead
to a reduced utility function in the rst stage which need not be single-peaked. In order
to circumvent this di¢ culty, existing papers make additional assumptions. First, they all
consider an ordering of the votes (rst on size, then on type) which guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium: Alesina et al. (1999) recognize for instance that this assumption is
made for tractability, in order to avoid issues of multidimensional voting, which is not our
focus.Second, most papers restrict themselves to lump sum taxation. In our paper with
income and preference heterogeneity, lump sum nancing results in the median location being
chosen together with the size most-preferred by the individual with the median distance to
the median agent. This is the same result as the one obtained by Alesina et al. (1999),
Perroni and Scharf (2001) and Etro (2006), which all consider that agents do not di¤er in
income. This shows that introducing income heterogeneity has no impact on the results in
the presence of lump sum taxation.
We then study the nancing of the public good through proportional income taxation.
Such an assumption is much closer to practice than lump sum nancing. Observe that
1More precisely, the set of regular (in particular convex) preference proles with a majority equilibrium
in multidimensional policy spaces is generically empty (Banks and Austen-Smith (1999)).
2See also Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004).
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citizensincome does matter in such a context, as people varying in income favor di¤erent
quantities of public good even if they have the same preference for its location. Also, as people
di¤er in two dimensions, we describe the polity by a two-dimensional statistical distribution
that need not be uniform on any dimension.3 Assuming uniformity is indeed a very special
case and makes it di¢ cult for the reader to assess which results (such as the features of the
equilibrium policy) may be generalized to other distributions. Also, assuming uniformity
eliminates the possibility of discussing the impact of some societal characteristics like for
instance polarization (Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2005)) or correlation between taste
and income on the policy outcome.
We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional median
logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate is more subtle and need not coincide
with the preferences of a citizen with a median trait. More precisely, we take as benchmark
the natural extension of the sequential equilibrium identied by Alesina et al. (1999) in
a lump sum setting (median location together with public good amount favored by the
individual with the median distance to the median location and the median income level)
and we show that this benchmark corresponds to the sequential equilibrium with proportional
taxation if (i) the distributions of income and of location are independent from each other, (ii)
the location distribution is uniform, and (iii) the income distribution is symmetrical. In that
case, the sequential voting equilibrium and the benchmark both lead to the socially optimal
public goods level and location. If only the rst two assumptions are satised, then the size
of the public good is smaller (resp., larger) than the level identied by this benchmark if the
income distribution is everywhere concave (resp., convex). For instance, if income follows a
Beta distribution that is positively skewed (as in all OECD countries), then the equilibrium
public good level is lower than the one identied by our benchmark, while both levels are
larger than socially optimal. As for the correlation between income and location preferences,
we investigate numerically the case where both distributions are uniform. We obtain that the
benchmark corresponds to the case where they are either perfectly correlated or independent
from each other. In the case where both traits are positively but imperfectly correlated, the
equilibrium public good level is lower than the one identied by this benchmark, which is
socially optimal.4
3We follow the same approach as the one adopted by Le Breton and Weber (2003) in the traditional
unidimensional model.
4It is di¢ cult to compare our results with the two other papers studying proportional taxation. Bolton
and Roland (1997) assume that people di¤er only in income and vote over the size of the public good. They
obtain the classical result that the voter with the median income is decisive. Gregorini (2009) introduces
heterogeneity in both preferences and income but only considers two income groups. Moreover, he assumes
that the public good amount is determined by a social planner rather than by majority voting.
3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the
case where the public good is nanced by lump sum taxation while section 4 is devoted
to the nancing with proportional income taxation. In both sections, we start with the
simultaneous voting game before analyzing the sequential voting game. Section 5 compares
the equilibrium allocation with sequential voting with the benchmark allocation obtained
from Alesina et al. (1999) and with the socially optimal allocation. We also show in this
section how equilibrium allocations are impacted by the shape of the income distribution
and by its correlation with the location distribution.
We now turn to the setting of our model.
2 The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of citizens of unitary mass. This economy
has to select a public policy consisting of two components: a horizontal component, which is
described as a continuous variable in the interval [0; 1], and a vertical component described
as a continuous variable in <+. While the model can accommodate several alternative
interpretations, it is useful to think of the public policy as a decision on both the type p
of a pure public good, facility or service to produce (the horizontal dimension) and on the
quantity or size g of this particular public good (the vertical dimension). A nice illustration
is the case where the horizontal dimension is simply the location of the public good.
Citizens are heterogeneous in two dimensions. First, they di¤er according to their pref-
erences for the di¤erent types of public goods. In that respect, each citizen is described by
a parameter  in [0; 1]. Second, each citizen is described by his/her private income y in the
interval [0; y].5 The statistical distribution of types across citizens is described by a joint
distribution F on [0; 1] [0; y] which is assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure on <2. We will denote by f its density and by F and Fy the marginal
of F on [0; 1] and [0; y], respectively.
The payo¤ of an individual of type (; y) when the policy (p; g) is selected is equal to
V (g) [  j  pj] + y   t(y)
where V 0 > 0; V 00 < 0; V (0)  0 and where   1 is a parameter and t(y) denotes the tax paid
by such a citizen. Therefore, the parameter  represents the most-preferred type of public
good by a citizen with type , irrespective of his/her income. Note also that preferences are
5This is without loss of generality since we can set y = +1; for instance to consider popular income
distributions such as the Pareto and Beta distributions.
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quasi-linear with respect to income which is implicitly assumed to be equivalent to private
consumption.6 We focus on the case where the tax is an a¢ ne function of income i.e.,
t(y) = ay + b;
where a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 0;b. The technology used to produce the public good in quantity g
is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale irrespective of the type of public good which
is selected i.e., up to a normalization, g units of numeraire are needed to produce g units
of public good. The government budget constraint is then given by
g =
Z 1
0
d
Z y
0
t(y)f(; y)dy
(1)
= b+ ayM (2)
where
yM 
Z 1
0
d
Z y
0
yf(; y)dy
is the average income in the economy.7
Combining all these elements, we deduce that the (indirect) utility of a citizen of type
(; y) for the policy (p; a; b) is
V (b+ ayM) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y   b:
We restrict ourselves to two categories of tax functions belonging to the a¢ ne family:
pure lump sum taxation (b > 0; a = 0) and pure proportional taxation (b = 0; a > 0).8
We start with the simpler case, lump sum taxation, then moving to proportional taxation,
where additional e¤ects crop up. In both cases, we rst assume that individuals vote simul-
taneously over the type and the size of the public good. We show that the conditions (on
the distribution of traits) to have an equilibrium (a Condorcet winning policy pair i.e., a
6Most contributions to the nation formation literature consider a quasi-linear setting. This simplifying
assumption has two important implications. First, it simplies the analysis as we rule out direct income
e¤ects (preferences for public goods are unrelated to income levels). Second, it implies that (Pareto) e¢ ciency
is equivalent to the maximization of social surplus which is here V (g)
hR 1
0
[  j  pj]Fd
i
  g. We come
back to the optimal allocation in section 5.
7All our results are robust to the introduction of a distortionary cost of taxation as in Bolton and Roland
(1997), in the form of a small quadratic cost that decreases each individuals tax proceeds by  a
2
2 y where 
is a positive parameter.
8We leave the analysis of the (simultaneous or sequential) determination of the more general 3-parameter
(a, b and p) model for future research.
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policy pair that is preferred by a majority of voters to any other feasible policy pair) are very
restrictive. We next introduce a sequential way to choose the two policies, assuming that
people vote rst over the tax policy and then over the type of public good. This sequence
of votes seems reasonable and is indeed the one most often studied in the literature.9 We
identify the equilibrium policy pair under this sequence of votes, and we study how it is
a¤ected by the bivariate distribution of voterstraits.
3 Lump sum taxation
In this section, we consider the case analyzed by Alesina et al. (1999) and Etro (2006) where
t(y) = b i.e., a tax which is the same for all citizens. The (indirect) utility of a citizen of
type (; y) for the policy (p; b) is10
U(p; b) = V (b) [  j  pj] + y   b: (3)
We see immediately that the individuals income plays no role in determining his prefer-
ences for either b or p. Obviously, individualsmost-preferred policy position p corresponds
to their own position . As for their most-preferred lump sum tax b, conditional on p = ,
it is given by the following rst-order condition
V 0(b) = 1;
and is thus the same for all individuals. Figure 1 illustrates the preference upper contour
sets of four individuals, when V (b) =
p
b and  = 3=2: Comparing the top left panel with the
two bottom ones (where individuals di¤er in income but share the same position ) conrms
that the upper contour sets are not a¤ected by the individuals income level. Comparing
the two top panels allows to see the impact of modifying the individuals position  on his
preferences.
Insert Figure 1 around here
We rst study the simultaneous determination of p and b.
9Alesina et al. (1999) motivate the order of this sequence by arguing that it resembles common budget
procedures in which the size of the budget is decided before its composition.The opposite voting sequence,
when type is chosen before size, is more complex, because the public goods type has an impact on individuals
most-preferred size. We compare the two sequential voting procedures with lump sum taxation in De Donder
et al. (2011).
10We assume that individuals have enough income or (unmodelled) wealth to pay any lump sum transfer
lower than or equal to b.
6
3.1 Simultaneous vote over both policy dimensions
Our objective in this section is to assess under which circumstances (i.e., distributions of
individualstraits) a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists when voting simultaneously over p
and b. We proceed as follows. In this section, we assume that the indirect utility functions
of the citizens are strictly quasi-concave (in Appendix 1, we show that a su¢ cient condi-
tion for quasi concavity is that V is concave enough and/or  is large enough). Under this
assumption, an alternative (p; b) is a Condorcet winner if and only if there exists a neigh-
borhood centered on (p; b) which does not contain an alternative defeating (p; b) i.e., (p; b)
is a Condorcet winner if and only if (p; b) is a local or di¤erential Condorcet winner (Banks
and Austen-Smith (1999)).
We rst characterize the set of voters who would favor a policy change in the generic
direction d to some given policy bundle. By looking at a specic direction, we show that
any equilibrium policy must entail the provision of the public good with the median most-
preferred location. Using this information, we characterize the tax component of the equilib-
rium policy as well. Finally, by looking at all possible deviations, we show that the conditions
that the bivariate distribution of characteristic F must satisfy for a Condorcet winner to exist
are very restrictive, and satised mainly by the uniform distribution.
Starting from a generic policy bundle (p; b), the individuals who (weakly) favor a deviation
in the direction d are such that
d;

@U(p; b)
@p
;
@U(p; b)
@b

 0;
where h:; :i denotes the scalar product and where11
@U(p; b)
@b
= V 0(b) [  j  pj]  1;
@U(p; b)
@p
= V (b) if  > p;
=  V (b) if  < p;
= 0 if  = p:
If we denote by dp the horizontal component of the vector d, and by db its vertical
component, we obtain that the set of individuals favoring the direction d (starting from
11Strictly speaking, the function U is not di¤erentiable with respect to p when p = , but since p = 
corresponds to the peak of the function, we set its derivative equal to zero. Not having to deal explicitly
with the non-di¤erentiability at one point allows us to simplify a lot the exposition of the results, without
of course a¤ecting them.
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(p; b)) is given by12
f(; y) such that  > p and dpV (b) + db [V 0(b) [  + p]  1]  0g
[ f(; y) such that  < p and   dpV (b) + db [V 0(b) [  p+ ]  1]  0g :
If we take a direction such that dp > 0 and db = 0 (i.e., an increase in p without
modication of b), we obtain the straightforward result that all individuals with  < p
oppose this move while all those with  > p favor this move. We then obtain that, to be
immune to deviations in this direction, the starting pair must be such that p = med, with
med the unique solution of the equation
F(x) =
1
2
:
In words, any public good location di¤erent from the median most-preferred one in the
population would be defeated by a proposal moving this location closer to the median.
From now on, we assume that p = med as initial location and we focus on the tax
component of the policy bundle. If we consider a deviation d such that db > 0, we obtain
that the set of individuals (weakly) favoring this deviation from (med; b) is given by
(; y) such that  > med and   med + + dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)
  1
V 0(b)

[

(; y) such that  < med and   med   + dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)
+
1
V 0(b)

: (4)
It is convenient to denote by  the variable  j  medj. Loosely speaking, this variable
measures how much an individual located at  values a public good of type med. Note that
 varies in the interval [; ] where     Max (med; 1  med). Formally, let H denote
the joint distribution of (; y) in [; ] [0; y] and let H and Hy be the corresponding two
marginal distributions. We have
H(x) = F(x  + med) + [1  F (+ med   x)]
leading to the rst marginal density
h(x) = f (x  + med) + f(+ med   x):
12The assumption that F is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure guarantees that
the set of individuals with  = med has zero measure. To simplify notation and save space, we restrict
ourselves to the description of sets with strictly positive measure.
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We can now express (4) in a more concise way:
(; y) such that  > med and   1
V 0(b)
  dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)

[

(; y) such that  < med and   1
V 0(b)
+
dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)

:
If dp = 0 and db > 0, we obtain that the individuals who favor the direction d are
characterized by
  1
V 0(b)
: (5)
It is easy to interpret this inequality. Observe from (3) that the utility of individual (; y)
when p = med is
U(med; b) = V (b) + y   b:
The rst-order condition for b is then given by
V 0 (b)  1 = 0:
Condition (5) then means that all individuals whose most-preferred lump sum tax is larger
than b support a move in any direction d that increases b with p constant (dp = 0; db > 0).
By contrast, individuals whose most-preferred lump sum tax is strictly lower than b would
support a move in the opposite direction,  d. For a majority of voters to prefer b to a move
in either direction d or  d, we must have
medV
0(b) = 1
, b = V 0 1( 1
med
);
where med is the median value of :
H (med) =
1
2
:
We have thus proved the following:
Proposition 1 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
b. Then, if a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists, p = med and b is the most-preferred lump
sum tax of the individuals with the median distance to the median .
It is interesting to note that the most-preferred lump sum tax of the median individual
(such that  = med, or  = ) is not part of the Condorcet winning policy pair. Indeed,
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it is easy to see that voters (other than med) unanimously support a decrease in taxation
from the policy (med, V 0
 1
( 1

)). The reason for this is intuitive: since p = med, the median
individual med obtains exactly the kind of public good he most prefers. He is then the
individual whose marginal valuation of the public good is the largest in the polity. In other
words, if this voter has his say on the lump sum tax, everyone would like to decrease this
tax because they all value the public good less (at the margin) than him.
We now turn to the conditions under which the policy pair (med; V 0
 1
( 1
med
)) is a Con-
dorcet winner. A rst necessary condition is that, whatever dp and for any db > 0, the set
of people who (weakly) favor a move in the direction d has a measure at most equal to one
half. This set of individuals is given by (4) where we replace b by V 0
 1
( 1
med
) to obtain
f(; y) such that  > med and   1(dp; db)g
[ f(; y) such that  < med and   2(dp; db)g ; (6)
where
1(dp; db) = Max

med + (  med) + med
dp
db
V (V 0
 1
(
1
med
)); med

;
2(dp; db) = Min

med   (  med) + med
dp
db
V (V 0
 1
(
1
med
)); med

:
The rst necessary condition is then that the measure of this set equals at most one half:
F(1(dp; db))  F(2(dp; db)) 
1
2
: (7)
To shed some light on this condition, we rst assume that dp = 0. In that case, condition
(7) simplies to
F(1(0; db))  F(2(0; db)) 
1
2
;
where
1(0; db) = med + (  med) > med;
2(0; db) = med   (  med) < med:
In that case, the set of voters who prefer the direction d (i.e., an increase in b without
change in the location) is given by an interval of people centered on the individual with the
median most-preferred location. Recall that people close to the median location have the
highest willingness to pay for this kind of good it is thus no surprise that an interval of
people around that median prefer a higher value of b. The fact that this interval is exactly
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centered on med crucially depends on the assumption that dp = 0: in that case, people
equidistant from med have exactly the same preference for an increase in b.
If we rather consider that dp > 0 (together with db > 0), the interval of people who prefer
an increase in b moves to the right: distance from med is not the only thing that matters
anymore, since people to the right of med benet from dp > 0 while people to the left of
med dislike this component of d. As dp becomes large compared to db, 2(dp; db) becomes
larger than med and the only people favoring such a move have a larger-than-average value
of . Similarly, if we consider dp < 0 (together with db > 0), the interval of people who
favor direction d shifts to the left, and as dp=db becomes su¢ ciently large (in absolute value),
1(dp; db) becomes smaller than med and only people with lower-than-average values of 
are in favor of direction d.
When db < 0; the set of people who (weakly) favor a move in the direction d is given by
f(; y) such that  > med and   1(dp; db)g
[ f(; y) such that  < med and   2(dp; db)g ; (8)
which is the complement to set (6). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for (p; b) to be a
Condorcet winning pair is then that both sets (6) and (8) have a measure at most equal to
one half, with translates to
F(1(dp; db))  F(2(dp; db)) =
1
2
: (9)
By denition of med, condition (9) is satised when dp = 0. On the other hand, this
measure will generically move away from one half as dp is increased (for any constant db),
except in very special circumstances. Note that condition (9) can be reformulated as
F(med + bd+ d)  F(med   bd+ d) = 1
2
for all d 2
i
 bd; bdi ; (10)
where F(med) = 12 and
bd is such that F(med + bd)   F (med   bd) = 12 . When d = bd,
this implies F(med + 2bd)   F(med) = 12 and therefore F(med + 2bd) = 1. Similarly,
when d =  bd, this implies F(med) F(med  2bd)) = 12 and therefore F(med + 2bd) = 0.
Hereafter, the distributions satisfying (10) are called median uniform. We have then proved:
Proposition 2 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
b. A Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists only if the distribution of  is median uniform.
The uniform distribution is of course median uniform, but there are other examples.
Take for instance any function h on

1
4
; 3
4

such that h(t) = h(1   t) for all t 2 1
4
; 1
2

and
11
R 1
2
1
4
h(t)dt = 1
4
. Let f be the function dened on [0; 1] as
f() =
8<:
h(1
2
  t) for all t 2 0; 1
4

h(t) for all t 2 1
4
; 3
4

h(3
2
  t) for all t 2 3
4
; 1

It is straightforward to check that f is the density of a median uniform distribution.
Despite some exibility, it should however be clear that median uniformity is not generic 
i.e., the condition is violated for some small perturbations of any median uniform distribution.
Since a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) generically does not exist, we consider in the next
section a sequential determination of the two policy dimensions.
3.2 Sequential vote
In this section, we proceed as in Alesina et al. (1999) and consider a sequential majority
procedure where citizens vote rst on the lump sum tax b and then on the type p. It is
immediate to see from (3) that there is a majority equilibrium in the second stage which is
independent of the decision on b in the rst stage. This majority equilibrium corresponds to
the median value med of .
Solving backward, in the rst stage the individuals anticipate the value of p that will be
chosen in the second stage and vote according to their utility function (3) where we make
use of p = med and of the denition of  to obtain
U(med; b) = V (b) + y   b:
This utility function is concave in b, and individual s most-preferred value of b (given
that  = med), which we denote by b(), is the solution to
V 0(b)  1 = 0 (11)
in the case of an interior solution. We have that
b() = 0 if V 0(0) < 1 i.e., if  is low enough and
b() = b if V 0(b) > 1 i.e., if  is large enough.
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
@b()
@
=   V
0(b)
V 00(b)
> 0: (12)
12
The sensitivity of the most-preferred tax of an individual to his distance to the median type
depends on the shape of V .
Figure 2 illustrates the iso-tax lines in the (; y) space. They are vertical, since the
income dimension does not play any role here.
Insert Figure 2 around here
Applying the usual median voter theorem, we obtain that the result of the vote is b =
b(med) i.e., the lump sum tax most-preferred by the individuals located at the median
distance from the median, which is the rule derived by Alesina et al. (1999). Note that, in
stark contrast with the preceding section, a sequential equilibrium always exists, whatever
the distribution F .
We have obtained the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote sequentially, rst over the
lump sum tax b and then over the public good type p. The unique equilibrium of this voting
procedure is given by p = med and b = b(med) i.e., the chosen type is the median one,
while the lump sum tax is the one most-favored by the individuals with the median distance
from the median on the location dimension.
Corollary 1 The Condorcet winning pair (p; b) obtained with simultaneous voting over p
and b, if it exists, is identical to the equilibrium of the sequential voting game where b is
chosen rst and p second.
When the public good is nanced with a lump sum transfer, the income heterogeneity
among individuals plays absolutely no role. We now turn to the richer case where propor-
tional income taxes are used.
4 Proportional income taxation
In the case of a proportional income tax t(y) = ay, the (indirect) utility of a citizen of type
(; y) for the policy (p; a) is
W (p; a) = V (g(a)) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y; (13)
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where g(a) is given by the government budget constraint (2) when b = 0: We proceed as
in the previous section: we rst show that there is in general no Condorcet winner when
individuals vote simultaneously over p and a. We then study the sequential game where
individuals vote rst over a and then over p. We provide in Appendix 2 the proof that
indirect utilities are quasi-concave with proportional income taxation if V is concave enough
and/or  is large enough. We then assume quasi-concavity of indirect utility preferences in
this section.
4.1 Simultaneous vote over p and a
We start by looking at the optimal policy (p(; y); a(; y)) of a citizen of type (; y).
Clearly, p(; y) = : whatever the size of the public good, the individual would like its
favored type to be provided. We then obtain that a(; y) is solution to the following rst-
order condition
V 0(g(a)) =
y
yM
: (14)
It is immediate to see from (14) that the most-preferred tax rate of an individual now
depends on his income, in sharp contrast with the lump sum nancing case. Figure 3 depicts
the preference upper contour sets of four individuals when V (b) =
p
b and  = 3=2: Not
surprisingly, the most-preferred tax rate is decreasing with the individuals income, since
taxes owed increase with income.
Insert Figure 3 around here
We proceed as in the previous section, starting from a generic policy bundle (p; a) and
looking for necessary conditions that its components have to satisfy in order for the pair to
be a Condorcet winner. Starting from (p; a), the individuals who favor a deviation in the
direction d are such that 
d;

@W (p; a)
@p
;
@W (p; a)
@a

 0;
where
@W (p; a)
@a
= V 0(g(a))yM [  j  pj]  y;
@W (p; a)
@p
= V (g(a)) if  > p;
=  V (g(a)) if  < p;
= 0 if  = p:
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We denote as previously by dp the horizontal component of the vector d, and by da its
vertical component. The set of individuals favoring the direction d (starting from (p; a)) is
given by
f(; y) such that  > p and dpV (b) + da [V 0(g(a))yM [  + p]  y]  0g
[ f(; y) such that  < p and   dpV (b) + da [V 0(g(a))yM [  p+ ]  y]  0g :
We use the same argument as in the preceding section to show that a Condorcet winning
policy pair must involve p = med: if it were not the case, a majority of voters would like to
deviate in the direction of the median  while keeping the tax rate a constant.
From now on, we assume that p = med and focus on the tax component of the policy
bundle. If we consider a deviation d such that da > 0, we obtain that the set of individuals
favoring this deviation from (med; a) is given by
(; y) such that  > med and y  V 0(g(a))yM + dp
da
V (g(a))

(15)
[

(; y) such that  < med and y  V 0(g(a))yM   dp
da
V (g(a))

:
If dp = 0, we obtain that all individuals who (weakly) favor the direction d (an increase
in b while keeping p constant) are such that
y  V 0(g(a))yM : (16)
Observe that the rst-order condition for an individual (; y) faced with p = med is given
by
y = V 0(g (a))yM : (17)
To illustrate the joint e¤ect of y and  on the optimal choice, we denote by ~y(; a) the
income level that satises (17) i.e., the income of an individual of type  who most prefers
a proportional tax rate of a when faced with p = med. Condition (16) shows that all
individuals who have an income lower than ~y are in favor of an increase in a (i.e., da > 0).
Figure 4 (a) illustrates condition (16) in the (; y) space. Assume that we start with the
value of a that is most-preferred by the individual with the median income and the median
location, so that ~y(; a) = ymed. Among individuals located at med, those who favor an
increase in a are those whose income is lower than the median income in the population.
Individuals located further from med on the horizontal axis have a lower marginal valuation
of the public good. As the benet from this good decreases with the distance between
individual location  and median location, so does the threshold value of income below
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which voters favor an increase in the tax rate. To satisfy the optimal behavior described by
(17),  and y must be comonotonic (in other words, they must change in the same direction).
Insert Figure 4 around here
One immediately infers from this gure that the policy bundle composed of med and of
the most-preferred tax rate of the individual with both the median location and the median
income is always defeated by a majority of voters who prefer a lower tax rate (and the
same location). The intuition is similar to the one exposed in the lump sum case, and is
based upon the observation that individuals with the median location are those who have
the largest direct benets from the public good. Consequently, a move to decrease the tax
rate from their most-preferred level is favored not only by all individuals with above-median
income, but also by poorer-than-median individuals who are located far enough from the
median location. This holds true whatever the distribution function F or H.
Let us denote by (med; a) the policy pair that is such that exactly one half of the polity is
in favor of an increase in the tax rate when the location of the public good is kept unchanged.
It is clear from above that this policy is the most-preferred one of an individual with median
location and with a larger-than-median income: ~y(; a) > ymed. For instance, in the case
where the distributions of locations and of income are both uniform (and independent), the
tax rate a is given by Z 

V 0(g(a))
yM
  d = 1=2:
Making use of the rst-order condition of the individual ~y(; a), we obtain that
~y(; a) =

+ 
=

2  1
2
;
i.e. that ~y(; a) > ymed as explained above.
It is interesting to note that, in the case of the uniform and independent distributions
of  and y, the tax rate a is also the most-preferred tax of an individual with the average
income yM and with the median distance to the median location, med: ~y(med; a
) = yM .
To prove this, it is enough to observe that the rst-order condition for an individual with
 =  and y = ~y(; a);
V 0(g(a))yM =

2  1
2
;
16
is the same as the rst-order condition for individual with  = med and y = yM
  1
4

V 0(g(a))yM = yM :
We summarize our results so far in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
a. Then, if a Condorcet winning pair (p; a) exists, it is such that p = med and that a is the
most-preferred proportional tax of individuals with median location and with a larger-than-
median income. In the special case of uniform and independent distributions of  and y, this
policy a is also the one most-preferred by an individual with the average income yM and the
median distance to the median location, med.
We now look at the set of people who prefer an increase in taxation coupled with an
increase in the location of the public good (i.e., a move dp > 0 and da > 0), starting from
(med; a). This set is dened in (15) and is represented on Figure 4 (b). The threshold
income below which individuals favor a move in the direction d remains decreasing in the
distance between individuals location and policy location, as in Figure 4 (a), but we now
observe a discontinuity for  = med = p. To the left of med, individuals do not favor an
increase in p as it moves the location of the public good further away from their bliss point,
while to the right of med individuals do favor such a move. The size of the discontinuity
increases with dp, the horizontal component of the move considered (for a given da). More
precisely, as dp increases the threshold income level decreases by V (g(a))=da to the left of
med and increases by the same amount V (g(a))=da to the right of med.
The conclusion we draw from Figure 4 is that the existence of a Condorcet winning
policy pair when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions is extremely unlikely. Even
if we start from a policy pair (med; a) such that exactly one half of the polity would like
to increase the tax rate while keeping the location constant, when we consider directions
where both dimensions are modied simultaneously, Figure 4 (b) shows that the bivariate
distribution of  and y must exhibit a lot of symmetry for the policy pair to remain immune
to these deviations. Moreover, even in the case of the uniform independent distributions,
there is no Condorcet winner. This can be seen from the fact that the income distribution
is bounded above and that ~y(; a) > yM . This last observation means that, if dp is large
enough, then the threshold income of an individual who is located immediately to the right
of med reaches the upper bound of the distribution. As is shown on Figure 4 (c), we obtain
in that case that a majority of voters favor a decrease in p coupled with a decrease in the
tax rate. We then obtain
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Proposition 5 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
a. There is no Condorcet winning pair (p; a), even in the case of uniform and independent
distributions of  and y.
We now turn to the sequential determination of both policy dimensions.
4.2 Sequential vote
In what follows, we consider a sequential majority procedure where citizens vote rst on the
tax rate a and then on the type p. We see immediately from (13) that there is a majority
equilibrium in the second stage which is independent of the decision on a in the rst stage.
This majority equilibrium, which we denote by p2, corresponds to the median value of :
p2 = med:
Solving backward, citizens are aware that their choice of a has no inuence at all on the
result of the second stage vote. Their most-preferred value of a, denoted by ~a(; y), is then
obtained as a solution to the following rst-order condition
V 0(g(a)) =
y
yM
: (18)
This rst-order condition is su¢ cient since the second derivative of the indirect utility func-
tion
V 00(g(a))  V 0(g(a))
is negative. If
V 0 (0) yM   y  0; then ~a(; y) = 0
and if
V 0(yM)yM   y  0, then ~a(; y) = 1:
From the implicit function theorem and the second order conditions, we deduce immedi-
ately that, if ~a(; y) is an interior solution, then
@~a(; y)
@
=  V
0(g(a))yM
V 00(g(a))
> 0; (19)
and
@~a(; y)
@y
=
1
V 00(g(a))
< 0: (20)
Not surprisingly, citizens endowed with a large income or distant from the median type of
public good have a low most-preferred proportional tax rate. From (19) we observe that the
18
sensitivity of the most-preferred tax rate to the distance from the median type depends on
the curvature of V . This also guarantees a further degree of freedom for the model.13
Figure 5 depicts the iso-tax curves in the type space [; ] [0; y] i.e., the locus of types
(; y) whose most-preferred tax policy is a.
Insert Figure 5 around here
From (19) and (20), we deduce that the slope dy=d of an iso-tax curve corresponding
to a = ~a(; y) is equal to
V 0(g(a))yM ;
which does not depend on  nor on y i.e., the iso-tax curves are a¢ ne functions. In order to
nd the equilibrium tax rate emerging from the rst stage vote, we have to nd the median
iso-tax line i.e. the iso-tax line that separates the set of types into two halves, with one
half located above the line (and favoring a smaller tax rate) and the other half located below
(and supporting a larger tax rate).14 Formally, the equilibrium rst stage tax rate, which we
denote by a1, is the solution to
	(a) =
Z 

d
Z '(a)
0
h(; y)dy =
1
2
; (21)
where
'(a)  yMV 0(g(a)):
Proposition 6 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote rst over a and then over
p. The equilibrium policy pair is composed of the median policy location med together with
the proportional rate a1 as dened in equation (21).
In the next section, we compare the public good levels and location emerging from this
sequential procedure under the proportional and lump sum nancing schemes, as well as
their socially optimum levels. We also assess the role played by the bivariate distribution of
voterstypes in these comparisons.
13In the sense that even if we assume a high , meaning that people have similar preferences for location,
we can mitigate this e¤ect by selecting an appropriate utility function. See also (12).
14Given the absolute continuity of F with respect to the Lebesgue measure, the set of individuals located
exactly on the median iso-line has zero measure.
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5 Comparison between equilibrium and optimal allo-
cations
Up to now, we have been mainly concerned with the existence and the characterization of
equilibrium public goods type and level under various arrangements. In this section, we
concentrate on sequential voting procedures, and we compare the equilibrium public goods
type and level obtained with lump sum versus proportional nancing to each other and to a
normative benchmark. This benchmark is easy to ascertain with quasi-linear preferences: it
is straightforward to check that the optimal policy (p; g) is such that p = med and g is
solution of the equation:
V 0(g) =
1
M
; (22)
where M 
R 1
0
[  j  medj]Fd.
We denote by gL and gP the equilibrium public good levels generated by sequential voting
(rst over g and then over p) under lump sum and proportional nancing, respectively. We
summarize the results obtained up to this point in the rst three lines of Table 2. Observe
that both sequential procedures dened above result in the socially optimal public goods
type, med.15 The remainder of the section then focuses on a comparison of public good
levels, with the objective to shed light on the relationships between gL, gP and g, and on
the role played by the distribution of types in this comparison.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
We obtain from Table 2 that the ranking of gL (obtained from equation (11) with  =
med) and g
 (obtained from (22)) simply relies on the skewness of the distribution of tastes
(i.e., on the comparison of med with M). The comparison with g
P is more complex because,
unlike gL and g, gP is a¤ected by the income distribution as well as by the taste distribution.
As we report in the third line of Table 2, the value of gP is determined by the proportional tax
rate a1 implicitly dened by equation (21). This tax rate a1 is most-preferred by individuals
with median preference med and some income level denoted by y^ and implicitly dened by
(18).
In order to compare gP with gL and g, we dene in the last row of Table 2 a natural
benchmark. This benchmark for the proportional tax rate, which we denote by amed, corre-
sponds to the most-preferred tax rate of citizens with a median income ymed and a median
15This is due to the linear specication of the disutility from consuming a public goods type distant from
ones own most-favored type. See also Gregorini (2009) for a normative analysis when taxes are linear.
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distance to the median, med (see equation (18)). The corresponding public good level is
then g(amed) = amedyM . Observe from the above formulas that gP and g(amed) di¤er only
according to the income level of the decisive individual. Comparing the income levels y^ and
ymed under various assumptions regarding the distributions of income and taste will then al-
low us to compare gP to g(amed), and even to gL and g when the comparison of y^ and ymed
is extended to yM . The benchmark g(amed) is also interesting per se, because it constitutes
the natural extension to our setting of the equilibrium identied by Alesina et al. (1999)
(with lump sum nancing).
We rst study the case where the distributions of income and of location are independent
from each other. We then lift this assumption in order to understand the role played by the
correlation between types.
5.1 Independent distributions
We prove the following proposition in Appendix 3.
Proposition 7 Assume proportional income taxation, that individuals vote rst over the
public goods size and then over its type, and that the two individual traits  and y are in-
dependently distributed. If (i) the taste parameter  is uniformly distributed and (ii) the
distribution of income y is symmetrical around yM , then the equilibrium proportional public
good level is the one most-preferred by the individual with the median income and the median
distance to the median when faced with p = med (i.e., gP = g(amed)). If condition (i) holds
together with Hy convex (resp., concave), then g(amed)  gP (resp., g(amed)  gP ).
Observe rst that the situation where the bivariate distribution H is uniform (which is
the one most of the literature has focused on, such as in Etro (2006), Gregorini (2009) and
Perroni and Scharf (2001)) is a special case where assumptions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 7
are satised. We now show how Proposition 7 allows us to rank the various levels of public
good reported in Table 2. Assumption (i) in Proposition 7 ensures that med = M (and
hence that gL = g) while (ii) guarantees that ymed = yM . Put together, we show in the
appendix that they imply that a1 = amed, and thus (see Table 2) that y^ = ymed i.e., that
gP = gL = g(amed) = g
.
If condition (i) in Proposition 7 is satised while Hy is convex, Proposition 7 states that
g(amed)  gP and we obtain thatby
medyM
= V 0(a1yM)  V 0(amedyM) = ymed
medyM
:
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If we further make the empirically relevant assumption that ymed < yM ,16 we obtain that
V 0(a1yM)  V 0(amedyM) = ymed
medyM
<
1
med
;
i.e., that the public good is overprovided under our benchmark, and even more so with the
sequential procedure with proportional nancing (gP  g(amed) > g = gL).17
Proposition 7 has not exhausted the set of possible (and interesting) distributions of
income. We now provide numerical illustrations of the comparison between gL, gP and g
when the two individual traits are independently distributed, withH uniform andHy a Beta
distribution. Figure 6 (a) varies the skewness of the income distribution for the family of
Beta distributions with linear frequencies (i.e., when either the rst or the second parameter
of the distribution is equal to 1). It reports the values of the proportional tax rates a1,
amed and also of a, dened as the rate that ensures the provision of the socially optimal
amount of public good (i.e., ayM = g).18 The rst condition of Proposition 7 is satised
by assumption, so that gL = g = ayM . A skewness of zero corresponds to the uniform
distribution (Beta(1,1)), for which, according to Proposition 7, g(amed) = gP , so that the
sequential procedure and our benchmark both correspond to the socially optimal public good
level (gP = g(amed) = g). A negative skewness within the family of linear frequencies means
that the function Hy is convex. Proposition 7 then shows that gP  g(amed), but we are
not able to compare them analytically to g since we have that ymed > yM . Figure 6 (a)
shows that a1 > a > amed (i.e., gP > g > g(amed)) if the skewness of Hy is very negative,
and that a > a1 > amed (i.e., g > gP > g(amed)) if the skewness is negative but small
in absolute value. In words, our benchmark leads to underprovision (compared with both
the socially optimal level and the result of a sequential voting procedure) in all cases with
negative skewness. Moreover, the sequential procedure overprovides public good (compared
to the social optimum) if the skewness is very negative. When the skewness of Hy is positive
in Figure 6 (a), we obtain that Hy is concave, and by Proposition 7 that gP  g(amed). In
that case, we obtain that ymed < yM , so that we cannot compare analytically gP and g(amed)
to g. We obtain numerically that a < a1 < amed (i.e., g < gP < g(amed)) in Figure 6 (a):
both the sequential procedure and our benchmark lead to overprovision of the public good.
16Note that the assumption that Hy is convex neither ensures nor precludes that ymed < yM :
17In the case where assumption (i) in Proposition 7 is satised together with Hy concave, proving that
the public good is underprovided under proportional taxation would require the unreasonable assumption
that ymed > yM . However, if assumption (i) is dropped as well so that
ymed
yM
> medM
, we obtain that
gP  g(amed) < g:
18We have chosen to report tax rates in Figures 6 and 7 because the scale is easier to interpret. The text
concentrates on public good levels, the link between comparison of tax rates and of public good levels being
straightforward since g = ayM for all values of a.
22
Insert Figure 6 around here
Figure 6 (b) performs the same exercise for another family of Beta income distribution
functions, namely those with single-peaked and non-linear frequencies.19 A zero skewness
corresponds to a symmetrical hy, and thus by Proposition 7 to gP = g(amed) = g. Observe
also that Hy is neither convex nor concave, so that we cannot apply Proposition 7 when the
skewness is not nil. We learn from Figure 6 (b) that amed < a1 < a (i.e., g(amed) < gP < g)
when skewness is negative and that a < a1 < amed (i.e., g(amed) > gP > g) when skewness
is positive. That is, both the sequential procedure with proportional taxation and our
benchmark underprovide (resp., overprovide) public good when the skewness of the income
distribution is negative (resp., positive).
In the next section, we go beyond the independent distributions assumption and study
the impact of the correlation between income and location.
5.2 Correlation between income and location
When the two marginal distributions are correlated, the picture becomes more complex.
Figure 7 shows both amed and a1 as functions of the correlation between  and y when H
and Hy are uniform and when the Gumbel copula is used (see Appendix 4 for details). With
H uniform, we have that med = M so that g
L = g. With Hy uniform, we obtain that
yM = ymed, so that we infer that a = amed. In words, the uniformity of the two marginal
distributions ensures that both the sequential procedure (over public goods size rst and
then type) with lump sum nancing and our benchmark lead to socially optimal public good
levels: gL = g(amed) = g. Moreover, in the case of independence between Hy and H, we
know from Proposition 7 that gP = g(amed). Figure 7 shows that amed = a1 also when the
correlation between income and position is perfect; a simple look at Figure 5 should convince
the reader that this is so, since the median iso-tax line remains the same in both the cases
of perfect correlation and of independence. We further learn from Figure 7 that amed > a1
when the correlation is strictly in between zero and one. This means that, except in the
cases of zero or perfect correlation between income and taste, the sequential determination
of the proportional tax rate a rst and then p leads to systematic underprovision of public
good in the case illustrated in Figure 7, while the other equilibria studied ensure the socially
e¢ cient public good level: gP < gL = g(amed) = g.
19More precisely, we study Beta(c; d) distributions where one parameter is equal to 2. Negatively skewed
distributions correspond to c > 2 and d = 2 while positive skewness corresponds to c = 2 and d > 2. The
case with zero skewness corresponds to Beta(2,2).
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Insert Figure 7 around here
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study majority voting over the size and location of a public good. Individ-
uals di¤er both in income and in their preferences for the public good location, so that the
polity is summarized by a bivariate distribution of these two traits. Public expenditures are
nanced by a¢ ne income taxation: we consider both the case of a lump sum tax and of a
proportional income tax. We study both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations
of the public good size and location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public
good follows the traditional median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation
rate is more subtle and need not coincide with the preferences of a median income citizen.
With lump sum nancing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equilibrium
consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred by the
individual located at the median distance to the median (as in Alesina et al. (1999)). This
policy bundle also constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case
of a median uniform bivariate distribution. With proportional taxation, there is no policy
equilibrium with simultaneous voting even if the bivariate distribution is uniform. We o¤er
a complete characterization of the equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the
general case (no assumption on the bivariate distribution of traits). We show why and how
our results depart from those obtained in a natural benchmark where the public good level
chosen is the one most-preferred by the individual with the median distance to the median
and the median income. We obtain a lower public good level than this benchmark when the
income distribution is concave, such as with positively skewed Beta distributions, and when
the correlation between income and location is positive but not perfect. We also compare
majority voting allocations with the socially optimal one.
This paper is a rst step towards a more general analysis of the majoritarian decision
process when the policy set is multidimensional. Further research would shed additional light
on the robustness of the conclusions established in the present paper. First, we would like to
know to which extent these results remain valid for a broader class of settings and of utility
functions. Is the quasi-linear form an inescapable constraint? The specic utility functions
used in this paper are common in the nation formation literature which has motivated us,
but we conjecture that some features of the equilibrium outcome can be extended to more
general formulations. A second promising direction of research would consist in comparing
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the equilibrium reached under sequential voting with another popular solution due to Kramer
(1972) and Shepsle (1979), in which separate committees vote on the various issues at hand.
De Donder, Le Breton and Peluso (2011) contain some preliminary answers to these two
questions. A third direction of research would consist in integrating the majority voting
approach described in this paper to a more general game of nation formation.
7 Appendix
In the two following subsections, we investigate the conditions under which the indirect
utility functions of the citizens in the lump sum case and in the proportional case are strictly
quasi- concave. The developments are based on a straightforward application of the classical
di¤erential test of strict quasi-concavity as exposed for instance in Green, Mas-Colell and
Whinston (1995)).
7.1 Appendix 1
In this rst appendix, we demonstrate that, under some appropriate conditions, the (indirect)
utility U of a citizen of type (; y) in the case of lump sum taxation
U(p; b) = V (b) [  j  pj] + y   b
is strictly quasi-concave. Without loss of generality, consider the case where  > p. The
bordered Hessian matrix D2U(p; b) attached to U is here0@ V 00(b)(  + p) V 0(b) V 0(b)(  + p)  1V 0(b) 0 V (b)
V 0(b)(  + p)  1 V (b) 0
1A
The utility function is strictly quasi-concave if and only if the determinant of this matrix
is positive i.e., if
2 (V 0(b)(  + p)  1)V (b)V 0(b)  (V (b))2 V 00(b)(  + p) > 0;
which is equivalent to the inequality
2 (V 0(b))2   V (b)V 00(b) > 2V
0(b)
  + p:
The right hand side is decreasing in p. Therefore, it is enough to check this inequality
for p = 0 i.e.,
2 (V 0(b))2   V (b)V 00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
  :
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The relevant (i.e., Pareto) range of values of b is the interval

V 0 1
 
1
 1

; V 0 1
 
1


. The
above inequality is tighter to satisfy when  = 1 and V 0(b) is small. Therefore, it will hold
true for all b 2 V 0 1   1
 1

; V 0 1
 
1


and all  2 [0; 1] if
1

  V (b)V
00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
  1 ;
i.e. if
 V (b)V
00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
 (  1) ;
which holds true when V is concave enough or/and  is large enough. For the sake of
illustration, consider the isoelastic case20 V (b) = b with  2 ]0; 1[. The above condition
simplies to
(1  )
2
b 1 >
1
 (  1) :
Since b 1  1

, the inequality will hold true if
(1  )
2
>
1
  1 ;
or equivalently if
 <
  1
+ 1
:
7.2 Appendix 2
In this second appendix, we prove that under appropriate conditions, the (indirect) utility
W of a citizen of type (; y) in the case of proportional taxation,
W (p; a) = V (ayM)) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y;
is strictly quasi-concave. Without loss of generality, we consider the case where  > p. The
bordered Hessian matrix D2W (p; a) attached to W is here0@ V 00(ayM) (yM)2 (  + p) V 0(ayM)yM V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  yV 0(ayM)yM 0 V (ayM)
V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y V (ayM) 0
1A
The utility function is strictly quasi-concave if and only if the determinant of this matrix
is positive i.e., if
2 (V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y)V (ayM)V 0(ayM)yM (V (ayM))2 V 00(ayM) (yM)2 ( +p) > 0;
20In the isoelastic case , the su¢ cient condition can be improved to the condition (1+)2 >

 1 or even to
the condition (1+)2 >

  if we dont look for a condition uniform with respect to .
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which is equivalent to
2 (V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y)V 0(ayM)  V (ayM)V 00(ayM)yM(  + p) > 0;
and, after some rearrangements, to
yM
h
2 (V 0(ayM))
2   V (ayM)V 00(ayM)
i
>
2V 0(ayM)y
  + p :
As in Appendix 1, the right hand side is decreasing in p. Therefore, it is enough to check
this inequality for p = 0 i.e. that
yM
y
2 (V 0(ayM))
2   V (ayM)V 00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
  ;
or equivalently that
yM
y
V 0(ayM)  yM
y
V (ayM)V
00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
  :
The relevant range of values of ayM is the interval
h
V 0 1

y
( 1)yM

; V 0 1

y
yM
i
. The
above inequality is tighter to satisfy when  = 1 and V 0(ayM) is small. Therefore, it will
hold true for all ayM 2
h
V 0 1

y
( 1)yM

; V 0 1

y
yM
i
and all  2 [0; 1] if
 yM
y
V (ayM)V
00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
 (  1) ;
which, as in the lump sum case, holds true when V is concave enough or/and  is large
enough. In the isoelastic case V (ayM) = (ayM) with  2 ]0; 1[, and since (ayM) 1yM 
y
yM
1

, the inequality will hold true if
(1  )
2
>
1
  1 ;
as in appendix 1.
7.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 7
With independent distributions of  and y, we have h(; y) = h()hy(y) and amed is solution
to the equation Z 

h()Hy(' (a1))d =
1
2
: (23)
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Under assumption (i), H() is the uniform distribution over [; ] and a1 solvesZ 

Hy(' (a))d =
  
2
(24)
while amed is such that
Hy(
+ 
2
' (amed)) =
1
2
:
The two tax rates do not coincide in general. It is of interest to identify the properties of
Hy which would lead to a1 being smaller than, equal to, or larger than the benchmark amed.
We have that, if Hy is concave (respectively, convex), thenZ 

Hy(' (a))d  (respectively,  ) Hy(+ 
2
' (a)):
Since
'0(a)  y2MV 00(g(a)) < 0;
and Hy is increasing, we have proved the last sentence of the statement of Proposition 7.
The case where Hy has concave and convex sections is also important as reected by the
standard assumption of single-peaked density. If we assume that hy is symmetrical around
yM = y=2, we obtain that amed is given by
+ 
2
' (amed) =
y
2
= yM :
Replacing a by amed in (24), and using the symmetry of Hy, we obtainZ 

Hy(

M
yM)d =
Z +
2

Hy(

M
yM)d +
Z +
2


1 Hy( 
M
yM)

d
=
Z +
2

d =
  
2
;
i.e., we have proved that amed = a1.
7.4 Appendix 4: Gumbel copula and the correlation between in-
come and location
To assess the intrinsic role of independence, it is useful to introduce a measure of departure
from independence. From Sklars theorem (Sklar (1959)), there exists a joint distribution C
on [0; 1]2, called a copula, such that its two marginals are uniform on [0; 1] and
H(; y) = C(H () ; Hy (y)):
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As an illustration, we now assume that both H and Hy are uniformly distributed, and
that the distribution H is obtained using the Archimedean copula
H(; y) =  1((H ()) + (Hy (y)));
where  is called the generator function. We provide an example with the so-called Gumbel
copula, where the generator function is given by
(x) = (ln(x)) c :
Increasing c results in an increase in the correlation between  and y: the correlation is equal
to zero (independence) when c = 0, and increases to one as c becomes large enough.
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Table 1: Survey of the nation formation literature 
  Public good's choice  Voters' heterogeneity  Uniform  Taxation 
Horizontal Vertical Both Preferences Income  Both Distribution
of traits 
Lump sum Proportional
Alesina Spolaore (1997)  X      X      X  X   
Le Breton Weber (2003)  X      X        X   
Bolton Roland (1997)    X      X        X 
Jehiel Scotchmer (1997)    X    X      X  X   
Jehiel Scotchmer (2001)    X    X      X  X   
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)      X  X        X   
Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004)  X      X1      X  X   
Perroni Scharf (2001)      X  X      X  X   
Etro (2006)      X  X      X  X   
Gregorini (2009)      X      X  X    X 
 
                                                            
1 Individuals differ in several dimensions (income, race, ethnicity, religion) but all these are summarized in a unidimensional index of distance, as in models of horizontal 
choices with heterogeneity in preferences. 
Table 2: Summary of results
Type p Level g
Optimal med V 0(g) = 1M
Sequential-Lump sum med V 0(gL) = 1med
Sequential-Proportional med gP = a1yM with1V 0(gP ) = 1med
y^
yM
for some y^
Benchmark med g(amed) = amedyM with V 0(g(amed)) = ymedmedyM
1The proportional tax rate a1 is implicitly dened by equation (21) while the income level
y^ is implicitly dened by (18).
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Figure 3 : Preference contour sets in Hp, aL space with proportional taxation
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Figure 5: Iso-tax curves with proportional taxation
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Figure 6 : Equilibrium tax rates as a function of skewness for Beta distributions
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Panel b : Beta income distributions with single  peaaked non  linear frequency
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Figure 7 : Gumbel copula with Hβ and Hy uniform
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